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• ffmpeg : Audio/Video Fade in/out

  31 mai 2017, par dazzafact

  I have this working Script with Audio fading. How can i input also a Fading for the video in and out. It always gives me an error :

  "Option filter:v (set stream filtergraph) cannot be applied to input url ./mp3/conv/1.m4a — you are trying to apply an input option to an output file or vice versa. Move this option before the file it belongs to."

  This Works with audio-fading :

   ffmpeg  -ss 00:00:00 -t 90 -i "concat:intermediate0.ts|concat:intermediate1.ts"  
  
  -i "./mp3/conv/1.m4a" -af "afade=t=out:st=84:d=6"  -map 0:v:0 -map 1:a:0 
  
  video/out515.mp4 -y

  This doesn’t Work with Audio+Vic-^Fading :

  ffmpeg  -ss 00:00:00 -t 90-i  "concat:intermediate0.ts|intermediate1.ts" 
  
  -filter:v 'fade=in:0:30,fade=out:250:30' -i "./mp3/conv/1.m4a" 
  
  -af "afade=t=out:st=84:d=6" -map 0:v:0 -map 1:a:0  video/out515.mp4 -y

• avformat/hls : Check local file extensions

  3 juin 2017, par Sysiphus

  avformat/hls : Check local file extensions
  This reduces the attack surface of local file-system
  
  information leaking.
  It prevents the existing exploit leading to an information leak. As
  
  well as similar hypothetical attacks.
  Leaks of information from files and symlinks ending in common multimedia extensions
  
  are still possible. But files with sensitive information like private keys and passwords
  
  generally do not use common multimedia filename extensions.
  
  It does not stop leaks via remote addresses in the LAN.
  The existing exploit depends on a specific decoder as well.
  
  It does appear though that the exploit should be possible with any decoder.
  
  The problem is that as long as sensitive information gets into the decoder,
  
  the output of the decoder becomes sensitive as well.
  
  The only obvious solution is to prevent access to sensitive information. Or to
  
  disable hls or possibly some of its feature. More complex solutions like
  
  checking the path to limit access to only subdirectories of the hls path may
  
  work as an alternative. But such solutions are fragile and tricky to implement
  
  portably and would not stop every possible attack nor would they work with all
  
  valid hls files.
  Developers have expressed their dislike / objected to disabling hls by default as well
  
  as disabling hls with local files. There also where objections against restricting
  
  remote url file extensions. This here is a less robust but also lower
  
  inconvenience solution.
  
  It can be applied stand alone or together with other solutions.
  
  limiting the check to local files was suggested by nevcairiel
  Found-by : Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
  
  Reported-by : Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
  Signed-off-by : Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
  

  • [DH] libavformat/hls.c

• avformat/hls : Check local file extensions

  3 juin 2017, par Michael Niedermayer

  avformat/hls : Check local file extensions
  This reduces the attack surface of local file-system
  
  information leaking.
  It prevents the existing exploit leading to an information leak. As
  
  well as similar hypothetical attacks.
  Leaks of information from files and symlinks ending in common multimedia extensions
  
  are still possible. But files with sensitive information like private keys and passwords
  
  generally do not use common multimedia filename extensions.
  
  It does not stop leaks via remote addresses in the LAN.
  The existing exploit depends on a specific decoder as well.
  
  It does appear though that the exploit should be possible with any decoder.
  
  The problem is that as long as sensitive information gets into the decoder,
  
  the output of the decoder becomes sensitive as well.
  
  The only obvious solution is to prevent access to sensitive information. Or to
  
  disable hls or possibly some of its feature. More complex solutions like
  
  checking the path to limit access to only subdirectories of the hls path may
  
  work as an alternative. But such solutions are fragile and tricky to implement
  
  portably and would not stop every possible attack nor would they work with all
  
  valid hls files.
  Developers have expressed their dislike / objected to disabling hls by default as well
  
  as disabling hls with local files. There also where objections against restricting
  
  remote url file extensions. This here is a less robust but also lower
  
  inconvenience solution.
  
  It can be applied stand alone or together with other solutions.
  
  limiting the check to local files was suggested by nevcairiel
  This recommits the security fix without the author name joke which was
  
  originally requested by Nicolas.
  Found-by : Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
  
  Reported-by : Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
  Signed-off-by : Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
  

  • [DH] libavformat/hls.c