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• How to convert YUV420SP to YUV420P using ffmpeg sws_scale or other efficient method ?

  3 septembre 2011, par limitfan

  Thanks in advance. Any suggestion will be appreciated.

• Merge commit 'b9129ec4668c511e0a79e25c6f25d748cee172c9'

  10 novembre 2017, par James Almer

  Merge commit 'b9129ec4668c511e0a79e25c6f25d748cee172c9'
  * commit 'b9129ec4668c511e0a79e25c6f25d748cee172c9' :
  
    h264dec : add a CUVID hwaccel
  
    decode : add a per-frame private data for hwaccel use
  
    decode : add a mechanism for performing delayed processing on the decoded frames
  
    decode : add a method for attaching lavc-internal data to frames
  
    decode : avoid leaks on failure in ff_get_buffer()
  This commit is a noop, see
  
  4776c61424fa32394e251e9769e1ad2c2fa55598
  
  9f1cfd88af88a7d7d5c56a368a46639dfdfdef75
  
  7fa64514c8d2ec4d3dcb5f194511609ddcc288e6
  
  81c021c6a2d7848c31984d65f225ba54bdd6f560
  
  0e00624389955bc559d75855d5c4876266d9575f
  Merged-by : James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
  

• avformat/hls : Check local file extensions

  3 juin 2017, par Sysiphus

  avformat/hls : Check local file extensions
  This reduces the attack surface of local file-system
  
  information leaking.
  It prevents the existing exploit leading to an information leak. As
  
  well as similar hypothetical attacks.
  Leaks of information from files and symlinks ending in common multimedia extensions
  
  are still possible. But files with sensitive information like private keys and passwords
  
  generally do not use common multimedia filename extensions.
  
  It does not stop leaks via remote addresses in the LAN.
  The existing exploit depends on a specific decoder as well.
  
  It does appear though that the exploit should be possible with any decoder.
  
  The problem is that as long as sensitive information gets into the decoder,
  
  the output of the decoder becomes sensitive as well.
  
  The only obvious solution is to prevent access to sensitive information. Or to
  
  disable hls or possibly some of its feature. More complex solutions like
  
  checking the path to limit access to only subdirectories of the hls path may
  
  work as an alternative. But such solutions are fragile and tricky to implement
  
  portably and would not stop every possible attack nor would they work with all
  
  valid hls files.
  Developers have expressed their dislike / objected to disabling hls by default as well
  
  as disabling hls with local files. There also where objections against restricting
  
  remote url file extensions. This here is a less robust but also lower
  
  inconvenience solution.
  
  It can be applied stand alone or together with other solutions.
  
  limiting the check to local files was suggested by nevcairiel
  Found-by : Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
  
  Reported-by : Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>
  Signed-off-by : Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
  

  • [DH] libavformat/hls.c