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• IJG swings again, and misses

  1er février 2010, par Mans — Multimedia

  Earlier this month the IJG unleashed version 8 of its ubiquitous libjpeg library on the world. Eager to try out the “major breakthrough in image coding technology” promised in the README file accompanying v7, I downloaded the release. A glance at the README file suggests something major indeed is afoot :

  Version 8.0 is the first release of a new generation JPEG standard to overcome the limitations of the original JPEG specification.

  The text also hints at the existence of a document detailing these marvellous new features, and a Google search later a copy has found its way onto my monitor. As I read, however, my state of mind shifts from an initial excited curiosity, through bewilderment and disbelief, finally arriving at pure merriment.

  Already on the first page it becomes clear no new JPEG standard in fact exists. All we have is an unsolicited proposal sent to the ITU-T by members of the IJG. Realising that even the most brilliant of inventions must start off as mere proposals, I carry on reading. The summary informs me that I am about to witness the introduction of three extensions to the T.81 JPEG format :

  1. An alternative coefficient scan sequence for DCT coefficient serialization
  2. A SmartScale extension in the Start-Of-Scan (SOS) marker segment
  3. A Frame Offset definition in or in addition to the Start-Of-Frame (SOF) marker segment

  Together these three extensions will, it is promised, “bring DCT based JPEG back to the forefront of state-of-the-art image coding technologies.”

  Alternative scan

  The first of the proposed extensions introduces an alternative DCT coefficient scan sequence to be used in place of the zigzag scan employed in most block transform based codecs.

  

  Alternative scan sequence

  The advantage of this scan would be that combined with the existing progressive mode, it simplifies decoding of an initial low-resolution image which is enhanced through subsequent passes. The author of the document calls this scheme “image-pyramid/hierarchical multi-resolution coding.” It is not immediately obvious to me how this constitutes even a small advance in image coding technology.

  At this point I am beginning to suspect that our friend from the IJG has been trapped in a half-world between interlaced GIF images transmitted down noisy phone lines and today’s inferno of SVC, MVC, and other buzzwords.

  (Not so) SmartScale

  Disguised behind this camel-cased moniker we encounter a method which, we are told, will provide better image quality at high compression ratios. The author has combined two well-known (to us) properties in a (to him) clever way.

  The first property concerns the perceived impact of different types of distortion in an image. When encoding with JPEG, as the quantiser is increased, the decoded image becomes ever more blocky. At a certain point, a better subjective visual quality can be achieved by down-sampling the image before encoding it, thus allowing a lower quantiser to be used. If the decoded image is scaled back up to the original size, the unpleasant, blocky appearance is replaced with a smooth blur.

  The second property belongs to the DCT where, as we all know, the top-left (DC) coefficient is the average of the entire block, its neighbours represent the lowest frequency components etc. A top-left-aligned subset of the coefficient block thus represents a low-resolution version of the full block in the spatial domain.

  In his flash of genius, our hero came up with the idea of using the DCT for down-scaling the image. Unfortunately, he appears to possess precious little knowledge of sampling theory and human visual perception. Any block-based resampling will inevitably produce sharp artefacts along the block edges. The human visual system is particularly sensitive to sharp edges, so this is one of the most unwanted types of distortion in an encoded image.

  Despite the obvious flaws in this approach, I decided to give it a try. After all, the software is already written, allowing downscaling by factors of 8/8..16.

  Using a 1280×720 test image, I encoded it with each of the nine scaling options, from unity to half size, each time adjusting the quality parameter for a final encoded file size of no more than 200000 bytes. The following table presents the encoded file size, the libjpeg quality parameter used, and the SSIM metric for each of the images.

  Scale	Size	Quality	SSIM
  8/8	198462	59	0.940
  8/9	196337	70	0.936
  8/10	196133	79	0.934
  8/11	197179	84	0.927
  8/12	193872	89	0.915
  8/13	197153	92	0.914
  8/14	188334	94	0.899
  8/15	198911	96	0.886
  8/16	197190	97	0.869

  Although the smaller images allowed a higher quality setting to be used, the SSIM value drops significantly. Numbers may of course be misleading, but the images below speak for themselves. These are cut-outs from the full image, the original on the left, unscaled JPEG-compressed in the middle, and JPEG with 8/16 scaling to the right.

  

  

  Looking at these images, I do not need to hesitate before picking the JPEG variant I prefer.

  Frame offset

  The third and final extension proposed is quite simple and also quite pointless : a top-left cropping to be applied to the decoded image. The alleged utility of this feature would be to enable lossless cropping of a JPEG image. In a typical image workflow, however, JPEG is only used for the final published version, so the need for this feature appears quite far-fetched.

  The grand finale

  Throughout the text, the author makes references to “the fundamental DCT property for image representation.” In his own words :

  This property was found by the author during implementation of the new DCT scaling features and is after his belief one of the most important discoveries in digital image coding after releasing the JPEG standard in 1992.

  The secret is to be revealed in an annex to the main text. This annex quotes in full a post by the author to the comp.dsp Usenet group in a thread with the subject why DCT. Reading the entire thread proves quite amusing. A few excerpts follow.

  The actual reason is much simpler, and therefore apparently very difficult to recognize by complicated-thinking people.

  Here is the explanation :

  What are people doing when they have a bunch of images and want a quick preview ? They use thumbnails ! What are thumbnails ? Thumbnails are small downscaled versions of the original image ! If you want more details of the image, you can zoom in stepwise by enlarging (upscaling) the image.

  So with proper understanding of the fundamental DCT property, the MPEG folks could make their videos more scalable, but, as in the case of JPEG, they are unable to recognize this simple but basic property, unfortunately, and pursue rather inferior approaches in actual developments.

  These are just phrases, and they don’t explain anything. But this is typical for the current state in this field : The relevant people ignore and deny the true reasons, and thus they turn in a circle and no progress is being made.

  However, there are dark forces in action today which ignore and deny any fruitful advances in this field. That is the reason that we didn’t see any progress in JPEG for more than a decade, and as long as those forces dominate, we will see more confusion and less enlightenment. The truth is always simple, and the DCT *is* simple, but this fact is suppressed by established people who don’t want to lose their dubious position.

  I believe a trip to the Total Perspective Vortex may be in order. Perhaps his tin-foil hat will save him.

• The Future of the VP8 Bitstream

  17 juin 2010, par noreply@blogger.com (John Luther) — vp8

  Recently we’ve seen software products such as VLC, FFmpeg, Logitech Vid, Flumotion and Tixeo adopting and using WebM and VP8 (the video codec in WebM) in exciting new ways.

  In addition to software developers, many hardware vendors have committed to shipping VP8-accelerated products based on our current bitstream in 2011 . Devices that use hardware acceleration for video are a very small percentage of overall web traffic today, but they are a rapidly growing segment of the market and our project must be mindful of these vendors’ needs. Given the longer lead times for changes in chipsets, hardware companies implementing the codec today need to be confident that it will be stable and supported as VP8 content proliferates.

  Like every codec, WebM is not immune to change ; the difference in our project is that the improvements are publicly visible, and compatibility and implementation issues can be worked through in an open forum.

  So, to maintain codec stability while also allowing for quality and performance improvements in VP8, we have added an experimental branch to the VP8 source tree. The WebM community can use this unstable branch to propose changes to VP8 that will produce the best video codec possible, but without the constraints of a frozen bitstream. At some point in the future, when the experimental branch proves significantly better than the stable branch, we will create a new version of the codec.

  Teams dedicated to improving WebM are actively investigating and evaluating new techniques, and are committed to do so for the long term. We encourage the WebM community to keep contributing as well. To learn more about the experimental branch and get involved, see our repository layout page.

  Jim Bankoski is Codec Engineering Manager at Google.

  

• Heroic Defender of the Stack

  27 janvier 2011, par Multimedia Mike — Programming

  Problem Statement

  I have been investigating stack smashing and countermeasures (stack smashing prevention, or SSP). Briefly, stack smashing occurs when a function allocates a static array on the stack and writes past the end of it, onto other local variables and eventually onto other function stack frames. When it comes time to return from the function, the return address has been corrupted and the program ends up some place it really shouldn’t. In the best case, the program just crashes ; in the worst case, a malicious party crafts code to exploit this malfunction.

  Further, debugging such a problem is especially obnoxious because by the time the program has crashed, it has already trashed any record (on the stack) of how it got into the errant state.

  Preventative Countermeasure

  GCC has had SSP since version 4.1. The computer inserts SSP as additional code when the -fstack-protector command line switch is specified. Implementation-wise, SSP basically inserts a special value (the literature refers to this as the ’canary’ as in "canary in the coalmine") at the top of the stack frame when entering the function, and code before leaving the function to make sure the canary didn’t get stepped on. If something happens to the canary, the program is immediately aborted with a message to stderr about what happened. Further, gcc’s man page on my Ubuntu machine proudly trumpets that this functionality is enabled per default ever since Ubuntu 6.10.

  And that’s really all there is to it. Your code is safe from stack smashing by default. Or so the hand-wavy documentation would have you believe.

  Not exactly

  Exercising the SSP

  I wanted to see the SSP in action to make sure it was a real thing. So I wrote some code that smashes the stack in pretty brazen ways so that I could reasonably expect to trigger the SSP (see later in this post for the code). Here’s what I learned that wasn’t in any documentation :

  SSP is only emitted for functions that have static arrays of 8-bit data (i.e., [unsigned] chars). If you have static arrays of other data types (like, say, 32-bit ints), those are still fair game for stack smashing.

  Evaluating the security vs. speed/code size trade-offs, it makes sense that the compiler wouldn’t apply this protection everywhere (I can only muse about how my optimization-obsessive multimedia hacking colleagues would absolute freak out if this code were unilaterally added to all functions). So why are only static char arrays deemed to be "vulnerable objects" (the wording that the gcc man page uses) ? A security hacking colleague suggested that this is probably due to the fact that the kind of data which poses the highest risk is arrays of 8-bit input data from, e.g., network sources.

  The gcc man page also lists an option -fstack-protector-all that is supposed to protect all functions. The man page’s definition of "all functions" perhaps differs from my own since invoking the option does not have differ in result from plain, vanilla -fstack-protector.

  The Valgrind Connection

  "Memory trouble ? Run Valgrind !" That may as well be Valgrind’s marketing slogan. Indeed, it’s the go-to utility for finding troublesome memory-related problems and has saved me on a number of occasions. However, it must be noted that it is useless for debugging this type of problem. If you understand how Valgrind works, this makes perfect sense. Valgrind operates by watching all memory accesses and ensuring that the program is only accessing memory to which it has privileges. In the stack smashing scenario, the program is fully allowed to write to that stack space ; after all, the program recently, legitimately pushed that return value onto the stack when calling the errant, stack smashing function.

  Valgrind embodies a suite of tools. My idea for an addition to this suite would be a mechanism which tracks return values every time a call instruction is encountered. The tool could track the return values in a separate stack data structure, though this might have some thorny consequences for some more unusual program flows. Instead, it might track them in some kind of hash/dictionary data structure and warn the programmer whenever a ’ret’ instruction is returning to an address that isn’t in the dictionary.

  Simple Stack Smashing Code

  Here’s the code I wrote to test exactly how SSP gets invoked in gcc. Compile with ’gcc -g -O0 -Wall -fstack-protector-all -Wstack-protector stack-fun.c -o stack-fun’.

  stack-fun.c :

  PLAIN TEXT

  C :

  1. /* keep outside of the stack frame */
  2. static int i ;
  3.  
  4. void stack_smasher32(void)
  5. {
  6.  int buffer32[8] ;
  7.  // uncomment this array and compile without optimizations
  8.  // in order to force this function to compile with SSP
  9. // char buffer_to_trigger_ssp[8] ;
  10.  
  11.  for (i = 0 ; i <50 ; i++)
  12.   buffer32[i] = 0xA5 ;
  13. }
  14.  
  15. void stack_smasher8(void)
  16. {
  17.  char buffer8[8] ;
  18.  for (i = 0 ; i <50 ; i++)
  19.   buffer8[i] = 0xA5 ;
  20. }
  21.  
  22. int main()
  23. {
  24. // stack_smasher8() ;
  25.  stack_smasher32() ;
  26.  return 0 ;
  27. }

  The above incarnation should just produce the traditional "Segmentation fault". However, uncommenting and executing stack_smasher8() in favor of stack_smasher32() should result in "*** stack smashing detected *** : ./stack-fun terminated", followed by the venerable "Segmentation fault".

  As indicated in the comments for stack_smasher32(), it’s possible to trick the compiler into emitting SSP for a function by inserting an array of at least 8 bytes (any less and SSP won’t emit, as documented, unless gcc’s ssp-buffer-size parameter is tweaked). This has to be compiled with no optimization at all (-O0) or else the compiler will (quite justifiably) optimize away the unused buffer and omit SSP.

  For reference, I ran my tests on Ubuntu 10.04.1 with gcc 4.4.3 compiling the code for both x86_32 and x86_64.