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Médias (1)
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The pirate bay depuis la Belgique
1er avril 2013, par
Mis à jour : Avril 2013
Langue : français
Type : Image
Autres articles (108)
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MediaSPIP Core : La Configuration
9 novembre 2010, parMediaSPIP Core fournit par défaut trois pages différentes de configuration (ces pages utilisent le plugin de configuration CFG pour fonctionner) : une page spécifique à la configuration générale du squelettes ; une page spécifique à la configuration de la page d’accueil du site ; une page spécifique à la configuration des secteurs ;
Il fournit également une page supplémentaire qui n’apparait que lorsque certains plugins sont activés permettant de contrôler l’affichage et les fonctionnalités spécifiques (...) -
Les tâches Cron régulières de la ferme
1er décembre 2010, parLa gestion de la ferme passe par l’exécution à intervalle régulier de plusieurs tâches répétitives dites Cron.
Le super Cron (gestion_mutu_super_cron)
Cette tâche, planifiée chaque minute, a pour simple effet d’appeler le Cron de l’ensemble des instances de la mutualisation régulièrement. Couplée avec un Cron système sur le site central de la mutualisation, cela permet de simplement générer des visites régulières sur les différents sites et éviter que les tâches des sites peu visités soient trop (...) -
Emballe Médias : Mettre en ligne simplement des documents
29 octobre 2010, parLe plugin emballe médias a été développé principalement pour la distribution mediaSPIP mais est également utilisé dans d’autres projets proches comme géodiversité par exemple. Plugins nécessaires et compatibles
Pour fonctionner ce plugin nécessite que d’autres plugins soient installés : CFG Saisies SPIP Bonux Diogène swfupload jqueryui
D’autres plugins peuvent être utilisés en complément afin d’améliorer ses capacités : Ancres douces Légendes photo_infos spipmotion (...)
Sur d’autres sites (9793)
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avformat/hls : Check local file extensions
3 juin 2017, par Sysiphusavformat/hls : Check local file extensions
This reduces the attack surface of local file-system
information leaking.It prevents the existing exploit leading to an information leak. As
well as similar hypothetical attacks.Leaks of information from files and symlinks ending in common multimedia extensions
are still possible. But files with sensitive information like private keys and passwords
generally do not use common multimedia filename extensions.
It does not stop leaks via remote addresses in the LAN.The existing exploit depends on a specific decoder as well.
It does appear though that the exploit should be possible with any decoder.
The problem is that as long as sensitive information gets into the decoder,
the output of the decoder becomes sensitive as well.
The only obvious solution is to prevent access to sensitive information. Or to
disable hls or possibly some of its feature. More complex solutions like
checking the path to limit access to only subdirectories of the hls path may
work as an alternative. But such solutions are fragile and tricky to implement
portably and would not stop every possible attack nor would they work with all
valid hls files.Developers have expressed their dislike / objected to disabling hls by default as well
as disabling hls with local files. There also where objections against restricting
remote url file extensions. This here is a less robust but also lower
inconvenience solution.
It can be applied stand alone or together with other solutions.
limiting the check to local files was suggested by nevcairielFound-by : Emil Lerner and Pavel Cheremushkin
Reported-by : Thierry Foucu <tfoucu@google.com>Signed-off-by : Michael Niedermayer <michael@niedermayer.cc>
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Merge commit 'b9129ec4668c511e0a79e25c6f25d748cee172c9'
10 novembre 2017, par James AlmerMerge commit 'b9129ec4668c511e0a79e25c6f25d748cee172c9'
* commit 'b9129ec4668c511e0a79e25c6f25d748cee172c9' :
h264dec : add a CUVID hwaccel
decode : add a per-frame private data for hwaccel use
decode : add a mechanism for performing delayed processing on the decoded frames
decode : add a method for attaching lavc-internal data to frames
decode : avoid leaks on failure in ff_get_buffer()This commit is a noop, see
4776c61424fa32394e251e9769e1ad2c2fa55598
9f1cfd88af88a7d7d5c56a368a46639dfdfdef75
7fa64514c8d2ec4d3dcb5f194511609ddcc288e6
81c021c6a2d7848c31984d65f225ba54bdd6f560
0e00624389955bc559d75855d5c4876266d9575fMerged-by : James Almer <jamrial@gmail.com>
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avformat/segment : Fix leak and invalid free of AVIOContext
6 septembre 2020, par Andreas Rheinhardtavformat/segment : Fix leak and invalid free of AVIOContext
seg_init() and seg_write_header() currently contain a few error paths
in which an already opened AVIOContext for the child muxer leaks (namely
if there are unrecognized options for the child muxer or if writing the
header of the child muxer fails) ; the reason for this is that this
AVIOContext is not closed in the deinit function. If all goes well, it
is closed when writing the trailer. From this it also follows that the
AVIOContext also leaks when the trailer is never written, even when
writing the header succeeds.But simply freeing said AVIOContext in the deinit function is
complicated by the fact that the AVIOContext may or may not have been
opened via the io_open callback : If options are set to discard header
and trailer, said AVIOContext can also be a null context which must not
be closed via the io_close callback. This may lead to crashes, as
io_close may presume the AVIOContext's opaque to be set. It currently
works with the default io_close callback which simply calls avio_close(),
because avio_close() doesn't care about opaque being NULL since commit
6e8e8431e15a58aa44cfdd8c11f9ea096837c0fa. Therefore this commit records
which of the two kinds of AVIOContext is currently in use to use the
right way to close it.Finally there was one instance (namely if initializing the child muxer
fails with no unrecognized options) where the AVIOContext was always
closed via the io_close callback. The above remark applies to this ; it
has been fixed, too.Reviewed-by : Ridley Combs <rcombs@rcombs.me>
Signed-off-by : Andreas Rheinhardt <andreas.rheinhardt@gmail.com>